1 Strikingly, this attempt to label a home-grown problem the work of Central Americans has quite a bit of tradition to it. Guatemala in particular has endured its share of Mexican barbs over the years for alleged or real threats to Mexico's perceived national interests.
At no time in this century was Guatemala more of a target for criticism than during the dictatorship of Manuel Estrada Cabrera (r. 1898-1920). For both Porfirio Díaz and Venustiano Carranza, Mexico's leaders for most of this period, Estrada Cabrera presented much cause indeed for diplomatic attacks. His ruthless regime sent thousands of refugees across the common border, 2 and his cronies kept hundreds all warring groups in Mexico. Estrada Cabrera often threatened the neighbor states of Central America, and he was successful on a few occasions in installing friendly rulers in El Salvador and Honduras. But to both Diaz and Carranza, these problems seemed small compared to Estrada Cabrera's biggest flaw: he often truckled to the United States in order to solidify his own position. In two instances, Estrada Cabrera even appealed to the U.S. government for help against a supposed "Mexican threat." 3 Even though the Guatemalan strongman can be blamed for much of the animosity that existed between his and the Mexican governments, however, Diaz's and Carranza's preoccupation with Guatemala remains surprising. The Estrada Cabrera regime certainly offered no threat to Mexico, as Guatemala was not larger or more populous than even an average-sized Mexican state. In addition, Mexican fears about Estrada Cabrera often proved exaggerated and even unfounded; as so often, perception played as large a role as reality. Therefore, we cannot understand Mexico's policies towards Estrada Cabrera's Guatemala solely in terms of that strongman's documented antipathy towards most things Mexican.
How, then, can we account for the Mexican government's antagonism towards Estrada Cabrera, which sometimes became so virulent that it destroyed other items on its diplomatic agenda? This paper attempts an answer by analyzing some of the most important Mexican clashes with the Estrada Cabrera regime with a view of two opposite, yet interrelated conceptual notions. On one hand, perhaps Diaz's and Carranza's behavior can be understood primarily in terms of the posture of a "middle power" seeking advantage in an anarchic state system in accordance with its relative power. 4 In that case, we can explain Mexican hostility towards the "small power" Guatemala with a view of its own relationship with the much larger United States. If Mexican leaders dealt with Estrada Cabrera primarily with the growing influence of the United States in mind, their policies could be explained within such an international-systems framework. 5 Or, on the other hand, the unfriendly diplomacy towards Estrada Cabrera could be traced to prevalent assumptions, ideologies, and ideas within the Mexican government.
In that case, much of the hostility originated in impulses independent from the international state system, even though the presence of the United States in Latin America fundamentally altered the actual policy pursued by the Mexican government. 6 Determining which explanation more closely matches Mexico's policies towards the Estrada Cabrera regime yields a preliminary answer to a much larger question: to what extent can historians understand the foreign policy of Mexico or any other country in terms of its position in the international pecking order? If external forces primarily shape international relations (as most historians assume in Mexico's case), 7 then the international history of Latin American countries is little more than a trite account of their failure to improve their position in this pecking order. But if Mexico's foreign policy was also influenced in large part by its government's attitudes and perceptions, and not just by realpolitik, this international history can be construed as a vital part of these countries' cultural and political history. It is with this thought in mind that we begin our inquiry with the interrelated "internationalsystems" and "ideological/perceptual" contexts of Mexican policies towards Estrada Cabrera's Guatemala. Ever since Central America declared its independence from Mexico in 1823, Mexican-Guatemalan relations have been fraught with conflict. Throughout most of the remainder of the nineteenth century, the two countries haggled over an exact common boundary. In particular, the Mexican and Guatemalan governments could not find agreement about Chiapas, a former Central American province that-through a rather questionable plebiscite-had elected not to join the rest of the isthmus in their secession from Mexico. Ultimately, of course, Mexico prevailed, as tiny Guatemala was no match for its much larger neighbor. But mutual suspicions, and Mexican paranoia about a supposed Guatemalan plot to wrest Chiapas away from Mexico persisted well into the twentieth century. With the border treaty of 1882, the issue was resolved peacefully, and the matter might have well ended there.
By that time, however, the U.S. government had joined the fray. On various occasions, the U.S. State Department had cast its long shadow over the border negotiations, and it had frequently intervened diplomatically on behalf of the Guatemalan position.
8 Moreover, U.S. Secretary of State James Blaine had come to regard Guatemala as the key state which could achieve a reordering of the politically fractious Central American isthmus under one strong hand, a move which would greatly enhance the feasibility of a transoceanic canal. In 1881, he offered Guatemalan president Justo R. Barrios, an ardent and militant unionist, 9 to help with "the establishment of a strong and settled union between the independent Republics of Central America." 11 Mexican policy contributed to Barrios' failure, as Diaz marched up enough troops on the border to force Barrios to divert some of the Guatemalan troops, a measure which strengthened the anti-Barrios coalition led by El Salvador.
12 As late as 1992, one Guatemalan historian criticized the border treaty as an act for which "history knows no pardon." Héctor Gaitán Α., Los presidentes de Guatemala: Historia y Anécdotas (Guatemala 1992), p. 50. 13 U.S. policies in the Caribbean provided another source for concern during the Estrada Cabrera era. Up to the 1890s, U.S. influence in Central America, unless it backed up Guatemala, had not worried the Diaz government. But U.S. plans to construct a transisthmian canal, and the Cuban-Spanish-American war of 1898, made it clear to the Mexicans that the U.S. government increasingly saw the Caribbean as an American lake. When U.S. intervention enforced the secession of Panama in 1903, the Porfirians realized the importance of playing a role of their own in Central America. To forestall an even greater political and military role of the United States in the isthmus, the Mexican government began to assume the role of a co-mediator in the perennial conflicts among the Central American countries. 14 Therefore, viewed from an international-systems perspective, Estrada Cabrera proved an uncomfortable neighbor for the Mexican government. Even though Estrada Cabrera was never strong enough to threaten Mexico, and even though most State Department officials preferred Porfirian Mexico to Estrada Cabrera's Guatemala, the Central American despot could cause problems for Mexico. In concert with U.S. interests, Estrada Cabrera could neutralize Mexican policies elsewhere in Central America. His army certainly looked capable enough to disturb the peace in neighboring Central American states. Estrada Cabrera's incessant clamoring for U.S. intervention in the region conjured up Mexican fears of a presence of U.S. armed forces both north and south of Mexico's borders. Guatemala's two main export crops -bananas and coffee -competed with Mexican products from the states of Tabasco and Chiapas. And when the Porfirian regime fell, to be replaced by a succession of governments less popular with the State Department, Estrada Cabrera, at least for a while, appeared to have the opportunity to engage the U.S. government on his behalf against hated Mexico. The international system, therefore, cannot be disregarded in our analysis of Mexico's hostility towards the Estrada Cabrera regime.
PORFIRIO AND A WAYWARD "PORFIRITO:" MEXICAN VIEWS
OF GUATEMALA AND ESTRADA CABRERA Nevertheless, in this writer's opinion, the international framework of Mexican-Guatemalan relations is of limited value in explaining Mexican policies. Although both Diaz and Carranza were always concerned about U.S. involvement in Guatemala and elsewhere in Central America, their contempt for Estrada Cabrera originated in other impulses as well. Most importantly, we need to consider the Mexican government's ideas about Mexico as well as its attitude towards Central America and its politics.
The Porfirians in particular viewed Mexico as Latin America's model republic. In their view, Diaz had emerged to consummate the Liberal Reforma of the 1850s, creating a strong, stable central state through "order and progress". Diaz had demonstrated his considerable political skills in breaking the power of the regional caudillos which had dominated Mexican politics since independence. An economic backwater for much of the nineteenth century, Mexico had begun to attract sizable foreign investments, particularly in mining and railroads, which helped the Diaz regime build up a national, albeit export-oriented infrastructure. This infrastructure in turn enabled Diaz to consolidate his control and develop Mexico's desert north, and therefore to end any possibility of further U.S. territorial gains. In the view of many among the Mexican elite, Diaz had succeeded in reaping "all the fruits of annexation [to the United States], without any of the dangers." 15 Mexico, the Porfirians hoped, would forever prosper in their alliance with foreign investors, holding an ever more prominent place among the Latin American nations and finally rivaling the prosperity and power of the industrialized North Atlantic nations.
Diaz's foreign policy was designed primarily to further this project. Internationally, it projected the image of Mexico as a stable country of unlimited economic potential, a nation that rewarded foreign investment. Domestically, it served to show Mexicans that their country had "arrived" in world affairs, and that ño nation, including the United States, would dare violate Mexican sovereignty (as foreign powers had done so often in the 1821-1867 period). These goals required a difficult double strategy. In investment negotiations, the Porfirians agreed to relinquish national control over key resources, but on political matters, they often stridently asserted Mexican national interests. When pressured by U.S. document for arrogating to the United States alone the privilege of defending the Americas against outside attacks.
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How did the Porfirians view Central America, and particularly Guatemala? Many members of Diaz's diplomatic service found Central America a less than ideal, if not horrendous, assignment. Clearly, none of the Central American countries, with the possible exception of Costa Rica, had matched Mexico's success in modernization. Diplomatic despatches of the Diaz era describe Central America's capitals as squalid snake pits, its countryside as untamed wilderness, its rulers as despotic barbarians, or porfiritos (little Porfirios) and its people as backward, uneducated "Indians." The Mexican upper classes, and particularly the European-oriented científicos, clearly considered Central America inferior to Mexico. The official press rarely discussed Central American affairs beyond reprinting the dispatches of international news agencies, but its commentary invariably attempted to drive home a point important to the Diaz regime: the Porfirians had helped make Mexico a better place than the "backward" Central American countries. 17 No one was more eloquent in expressing these views than longtime minister Federico Gamboa, a científico novelist whose notorious temper and occasional blunders kept him from holding higher office. Writing from one of his trips through Central America in 1900, Gamboa described the region as follows: "Picture a world of unbridled ambitions, of immense and mutual distrust, general economic crisis, unlimited tyranny, and a fear-inspiring disregard for human life." 18 To Gamboa, and not without some justification, this was a world that looked much like the Mexico of the 1830 s and 1840s: torn by strife, economically unproductive, and prone to foreign intervention. To the envoy, Mexico's role in this mess appeared obvious: In the spring of 1906, subversive activities imperiled Estrada Cabrera's regime from both Mexico and El Salvador. Right from the start, Estrada Cabrera implicated the Diaz regime. While Diaz claimed that he knew nothing about the exiles' activities in Chiapas, Estrada Cabrera used the opportunity to denounce what he saw as Mexican support for an invasion of Guatemala. In the words of Leslie Combs, the U.S. minister in Guatemala, 
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In May, a number of insurgents indeed entered Guatemala from Mexico, while the bulk of the revolutionaries prepared for battle in western El Salvador.
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This was indeed a glorious opportunity for Mexico to rid itself of Estrada Cabrera. But even though Diaz might have conceivably wished for Estrada Cabrera's overthrow, he decided to show that his "respect for international law" (read: his realization that the United States might come to Estrada Cabrera's assistance) exceeded his contempt for the Guatemalan executive. 24 thousand guns and "moral support" for an invasion of Guatemala.
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Interested in being the one to suggest joint mediation, Diaz approached the U.S. ambassador, David E. Thompson, and proposed his good offices. In particular, he offered to restrain the Salvadoran president, Pedro José Escalón, with whom he maintained cordial relations. 26 At last, Diaz and the U.S. State Department agreed on a concurrent course of action. While the governor of Chiapas concentrated the Guatemalan rebels, Diaz and U.S. Secretary of State Elihu Root cabled messages to Escalón and Estrada Cabrera urging both sides to remove their troops from the common border. Diaz also authorized the printing of articles in the loyal press which deplored the unrest in Guatemala.
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Even if these measures temporarily defused the crisis, lasting peace could not result from a few friendly diplomatic notes. Escalón did not control the situation in his own country, and Estrada Cabrera and Honduran president Manuel Bonilla massed troops at the GuatemalanHonduran border. In July, 1906, a group of Salvadoran free-lancers invaded Guatemala. Even though Estrada Cabrera's forces repelled the incursion within a few days, the Guatemalan executive used the pretext to mobilize his army against both Honduras and El Salvador. A full-scale war among the three republics now appeared imminent. inviting the belligerents to a peace conference. 29 Diaz then arranged for an armistice.
With a truce obtained, Mexico and the United States proceeded to lead the contestants to the negotiating table. In mid-July, representatives of all Central American governments met with Gamboa, Combs and William L. Merry, the U.S. minister to El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua, aboard the cruiser Marblehead. Merry served in a dual capacity as U.S. mediator and delegate from Costa Rica. 30 Gamboa soon showed that in contrast to the intentions of the State Department, 31 he did not intend to show merely a token representation at the conference. From beginning to end, as Combs later conceded, it was Gamboa, not he and the Guatemalan representatives, who set the agenda of the conference. 32 When Combs pressed for a settlement of past disputes, including compensations for the current one, Gamboa -who chaired the meeting due to his command of both Spanish and English -refused to allow any discussion of responsibility or fault for the present war. Gamboa also valiantly fought another clause in Combs' draft treaty: the delivery of all political refugees. 33 Gamboa simply would not allow the joint peacekeeping effort to turn into a punitive action against El Salvador.
34
In addition, Gamboa objected to Combs and Merry's evident intention to negotiate a future role for the United States in keeping peace in Central America. In his view, "the people of El Salvador ... would never consent to the interference of outsiders in their miseries." 35 When Combs became irate about Gamboa's intransigence and shouted "Mr. Gamboa, I am a short temper," the Mexican minister walked out of the meeting and threatened to leave the conference. When morning came, however, Combs and the Guatemalan envoys had backed down from their position; Merry had sided with Mexico. Taking advantage of discord between the two U.S. representatives, Gamboa had successfully played the U.S. representatives off against each other. 37 As he later wrote in his report, Combs and Merry had once almost had a "serious altercation" 38 during the meeting. Therefore, Gamboa prevailed, and Combs finally deferred to his two colleagues. In the end, the delegates adopted a protocol calling for disarmament, peaceful resolution of conflicts, and withdrawal of troops from all borders. 39 While Gamboa had attained most of his goals with the ambiguous resolution of the conflict, Estrada Cabrera had emerged the loser. El Salvador, Mexico's ally, emerged from the arbitration unscathed. Whereas the Mexican government received favorable reviews in the U.S. press, 40 Estrada Cabrera had not been able to take advantage from a situation which might have potentially placed him-as the one who had been unjustly attacked-in a strong position vis-à-vis El Salvador. Even more importantly, the Marblehead mediation had failed to further U.S. goals. The conference had not legalized a U.S. police function, and Gamboa had successfully opposed Roosevelt's efforts to make Mexico his handmaiden in Central America.
The Central American crisis of 1906 is a good example for the significance of the international system in Mexican foreign policy. Rather than attempting to help bring down the Estrada Cabrera regime, which would have been a natural course of action given Mexican attitudes about the Guatemalan dictator, the Diaz government played the part of an honest broker in restoring peace in Central America. To be sure, Gamboa had driven U.S. and Guatemalan negotiators to the edge aboard the Marblehead, risking a genuine U.S.-Mexican showdown over Central America in the process. But on the whole, Mexican policies had been motivated primarily by the desire to forestall direct U.S. intervention in Central America. 37 The State Department earlier had received notice of the differences between Merry and Combs, yet declined to intervene. See This desire to use Mexico's modest resources to keep U.S. influence in check, however, was not always at the forefront of Porfirian policy towards Guatemala. In April 1907, the Barillas controversy would highlight the significance of Mexican domestic concerns in dramatic fashion.
CASE TWO: THE 1907 LISANDRO BARILLAS AFFAIR
On April 7, 1907, two young Guatemalans stabbed former Guatemalan president Lisandro Barillas to death on a Mexico City street. Both the Mexican press and Mariscal were quick to blame the Estrada Cabrera regime. 41 The police soon apprehended the assassins, who testified that José María Lima and Onofre Bone, two military officers close to Estrada Cabrera, had commissioned and paid them to kill Barillas.
The murder of Barillas contained troubling political overtones. He had been one of the most prominent exiles in Mexico, an outspoken adversary of Estrada Cabrera and one of the leaders of the May 1906 revolt. Only a few days before his death, Barillas had talked to Thompson, expressing his allegiance to the idea of a Central American Union led by Nicaraguan President José S.Zelaya. Speaking in the name of a group of political exiles living in Mexico City, he had assured the Nicaraguan executive of his "unconditional support" for the plan. 42 Estrada Cabrera, who operated an extensive network of spies in Mexico City, no doubt was apprised of his rival's support for Zelaya and decided to remove him.
The case immediately turned into a major diplomatic crisis, as well as a conflict within the Diaz cabinet. The hawks around Mariscal and Gamboa appeared determined to obtain vengeance from Estrada Cabrera. But concerned about the impact of a meaningless showdown with Guatemala on Mexico's image in Europe and the Unitéd States, a "dovish" faction around Finance Minister José Y. Limantour argued for the use of the normal legal channels to expose the complicity of the Guatemalan government. Against the advice of the "doves," Mariscal asked for Lima's extradition to Mexico, and Bone's presence at his trial as a witness. 43 The Foreign Secretary clearly hoped that the outcry over the affair would remove Estrada Cabrera from office, or at least provoke his complete diplomatic isolation. But the Guatemalan president quickly rejected Mariscal's ridiculous request. He pointed out that the extradition treaty protected each country's own nationals from delivery to another country; indeed, the Guatemalan president would have placed himself in an untenable situation by agreeing to extradite one of his own generals. Prodded by a Geiman diplomatic démarche, he offered to try Lima in Guatemala. Mariscal refused and threatened to break relations unless Estrada Cabrera delivered both suspects.
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At this point in the controversy, it seemed that the "hawks" had gained the upper hand, as Diaz's cabinet came close to deciding on an invasion of Guatemala. 45 Mexico could count on the help of Zelaya, who apparently offered to attack Estrada Cabrera's forces if Mexico should go to war. 46 When the circle of ministers met again a few weeks later, however, the president threw his weight behind the "doves," who for fear of alienating foreign investors opposed Mariscal's quest for war. Diaz, who usually supported his Foreign Secretary on matters of foreign policy, deserted Mariscal on the advice of the General Staff, which deemed a military operation against Guatemala too costly and potentially counterproductive. Disappointed, Mariscal came close to resigning his post. 47 The Diaz regime then blew off some steam by authorizing the publication of a host of articles hostile to Estrada Cabrera in the Mexico City press and lifting its supervision over Guatemalan exiles in Chiapas. 48 These public tirades against Estrada Cabrera constituted a last-ditch effort to salvage some measure of respectability from a "disastrous diplomatic defeat," which in the words of a prominent científico had been due to Mariscal's and Diaz's combined 155 years of age. 49 Unable to get what it really wanted, the Mexican government had at least maneuvered Estrada Cabrera into a position in which he appeared the villain before the Mexican public.
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While Mariscal, Díaz and Limantour were haggling over an appropriate response to the crisis, a near-assassination further clouded matters. After an unsuccessful attempt on Estrada Cabrera's life, his Foreign Minister, Juan Barrios, told Gamboa he had information that his legation housed some of the participants in the ambush. 51 Gamboa's response was vitriolic, inviting Barrios in unusually harsh language to search the legation in person.
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Even though Barrios turned down Gamboa's not-so-kind invitation, relations between Mexico and Guatemala had sunk to an all-time low. Mariscal ordered Gamboa whisked off to El Salvador, from whence he was soon recalled to Mexico City, which constituted an effective interruption of diplomatic ties.
53 Estrada Cabrera and Diaz had moved troops to the border, and Diaz now belatedly heeded Gamboa's advice, ordering his troops to remain in Chiapas even after the passing of the controversy. As he told U.S. Ambassador David E. Thompson, he was still prepared for war if the Guatemalans fired the first shot. asserting that Mexico would neither break relations nor engage in any other hostile demonstration against Guatemala. 55 But it was obvious that Washington had weighed in with the doves in the Diaz cabinet and had aided in the about-face of the Mexican government. The softer tones pleased the State Department and paved the way for negotiations on posting a unit of the U.S. National Guard at Eagle Pass, Texas, to help control anti-Diaz rebels in the border region. 56 When the smoke of the Barillas controversy had cleared, Root expressed his willingness "to contain Guatemala within the limits of justice." 57 In general, though, U.S.-Mexican relations had cooled considerably, and much to Diaz's disadvantage. Mexican diplomacy, which had appeared so adroit in the Marblehead negotiations, suddenly looked impetuous and ill-considered. Diaz had squandered much leverage in Central American affairs: his unduly menacing attitude towards Guatemala had called into question the rationality and reliability of Mexican diplomacy. The Barillas controversy helped set in motion a trend which progressively brought the United States and Mexico into conflicting positions over Central America, a development which could only harm the much weaker Mexican position.
At home, the incident damaged the Diaz regime as well. In the beginning, the government-subsidized press as well as the opposition papers had unanimously backed Diaz's position, even if some of them had advocated a rupture of diplomatic relations. 58 After Diaz's conversion from hawk to dove, however, El Tiempo and other opposition papers accused him of giving in to Uncle Sam and failing to defend Mexico's national honor. 59 Clearly, the initial hard-line position pleased many Mexican nationalists, and success would have certainly brought applause for Diaz. When he backed down in failure, however, all too apparently prodded by the United States, Diaz became the target of criticism from all quarters.
The Barillas controversy represented a momentous assertion of domestic over international considerations in Mexican foreign-policy formulation. Mariscal's jingoistic posture disregarded both Mexico's inability to force Estrada Cabrera to deliver the suspect and the rest of his country's foreign-policy agenda. Imperiling important negotiations with the U.S.State Department as well as Mexico's position in the Central American peace talks which were to culminate in the 1907 Washington Conference, Mariscal pretended to flog the wayward porfirito who had shown the audacity to violate Mexican sovereignty in order to kill an adversary. In so doing, the Mexican government acted on its own instincts rather than with a view of the international scene. Even if U.S. pressure ultimately helped soften the stance of the Mexican government, the Diaz regime had demonstrated that U.S. hegemony was not always its chief concern in Central America. Had it been its main worry in April 1907, the Barillas controversy never would have occurred.
CASE THREE: ESTRADA CABRERA AND THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION, 1911 REVOLUTION, -1916 Even though the Mexican Revolution brought-among other things-a change of rulers, the country's problems with Estrada Cabrera persisted throughout the 1911-1920 period. Frequently slipping into varying states of dementia, the veteran Guatemalan president still saw himself as the potential redeemer of his dreams of a united Central America including Chiapas. Thus, the unrest in Mexico was welcome news to him. 60 coup ended this flun-y of tensions. In fact, relations between Huerta and Estrada Cabrera were surprisingly cordial. 62 Obviously, the Wilson administration's approach to foreign affairs had been the primary reason for this détente between Mexico and Guatemala. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's insistence on "good," lawfully established government in Latin America had established the Huerta and Estrada Cabrera regimes as two of the pariahs of the Western Hemisphere. This policy had obviously run up against dictators who had ordered the assassination of their two predecessors, and whose unpopularity within their own countries was virtually universal. 63 Therefore, Huerta and Estrada Cabrera had seen no choice but to cooperate with one another.
With the victory of the Carranza faction, however, the old antagonism resumed. As if to parry criticism of his own ruthless rule, Estrada Cabrera soon paid homage to the vintage anti-Mexicanism of the Guatemalan elites, denouncing the Carranza regime and depicting Mexico as a chaotic society in need of law and order. He also decried Carranza's economic nationalism and blamed Mexico for subversive stirrings within his own Liberal party.
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But it was Chiapas that provided the spark for the crisis in relations. Concerned about the unrest which spilled over from the neighboring Mexican state into Guatemala, 65 Estrada Cabrera attempted to meddle in the affairs of Chiapas throughout the 1915-1918 period. The Carrancistas could not gain control of the situation in the border state, and the military bands roaming throughout the area disregarded an international boundary that continued to be, at best, poorly marked and guarded, if not irrelevant. 66 On several occasions in late 1915, Guatemalan exile troops and Mexican marauders invaded Guatemala without Carranza's knowledge. 67 By December, however, Estrada Cabrera had largely succeeded in guarding the Guatemalan border and preventing further illegal crossings. While Carranza's leading general, Alvaro Obregón, moved divisions into Chiapas in an attempt to bring it under Constitutionalist control, the Guatemalan president massed 18,000 troops on the Mexican border.
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Not surprisingly, Carranza reacted angrily to this Guatemalan show of force. Unable for the moment to do more, he decided to press a number of claims against the Guatemalan government. In the past years, Guatemalan authorities had jailed a large number of Mexicans for smuggling and other activities. Often, these detainees languished for years in sordid prison cells without a formal charge or trial brought against them. When Carranza attempted to repatriate these prisoners and prevent further offenses against Mexican citizens, he ran into rock-solid resistance. Backing up his local authorities, especially Jorge Ubico, the jefe político of the department of Retalhuleu, Estrada Cabrera insisted on full punishment for all Mexicans engaged in smuggling, "conspiracy" and "subversive activities." 69 Even more galling to Carranza was the matter of the counterrevolutionary movement of Félix Díaz. Don Porfirio's nephew maintained considerable support in the Mexican southeast, where the economy had remained strong through the 1907 slump. In the southeast, the regional elites, with the exception of those in Yucatan, largely desired a return of the Porfirian camarilla. 70 But Félix Diaz's success in the region was not merely the result of favorable political geography. Beginning in 1915, the Carranza government found more and more evidence linking Estrada Cabrera to the continued vigor of the Felicistas and other rebels in Chiapas. In fact, the Guatemalan government, for all its denials, 71 gave shelter to sizable Felicista groups, bought arms for the rebels in New York, had them shipped to Guatemala on boats owned by the United Fruit Company, and possibly handed out financial assistance as well. 72 In aiding Félix Díaz, the Guatemalan president hardly acted out of a newly discovered love for Porfirismo. As long as the military struggle continued, it was in his interest to weaken Mexican central authority in Chiapas. Possibly, Estrada Cabrera, in his increasing state of dementia, entertained faint hope for the secession of Chiapas. Even more importantly, at several junctures during the Diaz regime, Mexico had been able to threaten Guatemala by marching up troops in the Soconusco. Such a venture became much less likely at a time when the Felicista rebellion held its ground in the Mexican southeast. In addition, by helping Félix Díaz, Estrada Cabrera assured himself of a powerful friend in Chiapas.
The enmity between Carranza and Estrada Cabrera suggests a continuity of policy from the Diaz to the Carranza regime. Carranza likely shared Mariscal's assessment of Estrada Cabrera as an implacable enemy and a friend of the Yankees. Indeed, rumors circulated that Estrada Cabrera had sent agents to Mexico to assassinate Carranza and Foreign Secretary Cándido Aguilar. 73 The trouble with Guatemala also illustrates to what extent the turmoil during the Revolution had forced a defensive orientation upon Mexican foreign policy. As in the period of civil war and the Restored Republic in the 1860 s and 1870s, Mexico once again needed to defend its southeastern boundary. To be sure, Estrada Cabrera never launched an attempt to wrest Chiapas or at least the Soconusco from Mexico. Nevertheless, Carranza's posture in Central America -at least initiallywas a defensive one, since the Felicistas posed a peril to the supremacy of his faction in Chiapas. By contrast, loftier Mexican goals in the isthmus, such as reining in U.S. influence and cultivating ties with nationalist Central American factions, would have to wait for much better days.
